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DELIBERATION AND DETERMINISM: WHY
DETERMINISTIC MANIPULATION IS NOT A
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By Gregg D. Caruso
This paper aims to defend deliberation-compatibilism against several objections, including a recent
counterexample by Yishai Cohen that involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she
performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It begins by offering a Moorean-style proof
of deliberation-compatibilism. It then turns to the leading argument for deliberation-incompatibilism,
which is based on the presumed incompatibility of causal determinism and the ‘openness’ required for
rational deliberation. The paper explains why this argument fails and develops a coherent account of
how one can rationally deliberate and believe in causal determinism without inconsistency. The second
half of the paper then takes up Cohen’s proposed counterexample and his Four-Case Deliberation Argu-
ment (FCDA) against deliberation-compatibilism, which is meant to mirror Derk Pereboom’s famous
Four-Case Manipulation Argument. In response, the author defends a hard-line reply to FCDA but
also argues that the notion of ‘sourcehood’ relevant to rational deliberation differs from that involved in
free will.
Keywords: determinism, reason, rational deliberation, manipulation, compatibil-
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Causal determinism is the thesis that every event and action, including human
action, is the inevitable result of proceeding events and actions in conjunction
with the laws of nature. Besides the usual threats that causal determinism
poses to free will and basic desert moral responsibility (see Caruso 2012, 2021;
Pereboom 2001, 2014), some philosophers maintain that belief in the truth of
causal determinism also poses a threat to rational deliberation (see, e.g., Ginet
1966; Haji 2012; Kant 1785/1981; Taylor 1966). Those who find this threat
illusory are deliberation-compatibilists:1
1 The opening of this paper, including the definitions of deliberation-compatibilism and
-incompatibilism, mirrors in form and content of the opening of Yishai Cohen’s (2018) paper.
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Deliberation-Compatibilism: S’s deliberating and being rational is compatible
with S’s believing that their actions are causally determined by antecedent conditions
beyond their control.
Their opponents are deliberation incompatibilists:
Deliberation-Incompatibilism: S’s deliberating and being rational is incompatible
with S’s believing that their actions are causally determined by antecedent conditions
beyond their control.
This paper aims to defend deliberation-compatibilism against several
objections, including a recent counterexample by Yishai Cohen (2018) that
involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be
the result of deterministic manipulation.
In Section I, I begin by offering a Moorean-style proof of deliberation-
compatibilism and consider one possible reply. I then turn, in Section II, to
the leading argument for deliberation-incompatibilism, which is based on the
presumed incompatibility of causal determinism and the ‘openness’ required
for rational deliberation. I explain why this argument fails and develops a
coherent account of how one can rationally deliberate and believe in causal
determinism without inconsistency. The account, as we’ll see, draws heavily on
previous work by Derk Pereboom (2014), Dana Nelkin (2004, 2011), and others,
and offers an epistemic openness condition and an epistemic condition on the
efficacy of deliberation. I then turn, in Section III, to Cohen’s counterexample
and spell out in detail his so-called Four-Case Deliberation Argument (FCDA) against
deliberation-compatibilism, which is meant to mirror Pereboom’s (2001, 2014)
famous Four-Case Manipulation Argument (FCMA). In Section IV, I respond to
Cohen by offering a ‘hard-line’ reply to his FCDA and in the process explore
some deeper issues related to the notions of ‘sourcehood’ and ‘control’.
I. MOOREAN-STYLE PROOF OF
DELIBERATION-COMPATIBILISM
Deliberation is an essential component of action-guidance. It includes the ability
to form and revise a conception of how we each wish to live, to conform
behaviour to various goals and ends, and to deliberate among alternative
means to achievement of those ends. It is a process or activity in which one
figures out what to do. As Richard Taylor (1966: 168) notes, deliberation
has ‘as its aim or goal a decision to act’, as opposed to the goal of merely
forming a belief about which action one will perform. And as Yishai Cohen
writes, ‘Unlike the epistemic activity of inferring or predicting what will occur,
deliberation is an activity or process that is intended to play an explanatory
role with respect to what one ends up doing’ (2018: 86). For the purposes of
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ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF RATIONAL DELIBERATION AND DETERMINISM 3
this paper, I will adopt the following definition of deliberation offered by Derk
Pereboom:
(D) S deliberates just in case S is engaged in an active mental process whose aim is
to figure out what to do from among a number of distinct, i.e. mutually incompatible,
alternatives, a process understood as one that can (but need not) include the weighing
and evaluating of reasons for the options for what to do. (2014: 110)
Rational deliberation, as distinct from deliberation simpliciter, requires that
in addition to the above, the beliefs salient to an agent’s deliberation be
consistent. That is, in order to rationally deliberate about whether to do A1
or A2, where A1 and A2 are distinct actions, an agent must not have any
inconsistent beliefs that are salient to her deliberation about whether to do A1
or A2 (Cohen 2018: 86). This means that I cannot rationally deliberate about
whether I should walk home from campus today or use my powers of flight and
fly, while also believing that I’m human and humans are incapable of flight.
The question under consideration in this paper is whether rational
deliberation is compatible with belief in causal determinism. I maintain that
it is. And in support of that claim I offer the following simple argument:
(1) If S can rationally deliberate among distinct actions A1. . . An and believe
that their actions are causally determined by antecedent conditions beyond
their control, then deliberation-compatibilism is correct—i.e., S’s deliber-
ating and being rational is compatible with S’s believing that their actions
are causally determined by antecedent conditions beyond their control.
(2) S can rationally deliberate among distinct actions A1. . . An and believe
that their actions are causally determined by causal conditions beyond
their control. [In fact, I did both this morning!]
(3) Therefore, deliberation-compatibilism is correct—i.e., S’s deliberating
and being rational is compatible with S’s believing that their actions are
causally determined by antecedent conditions beyond their control.
As proof of premise (2), the crucial premise, I offer the following pair of Moorean
facts—facts I take to be more certain than any philosophical arguments to the
contrary:
(a) I rationally deliberated this morning about what to wear. [I weighed
multiple options, considered the weather, what I would be doing, who
I might see, what looked best, and ultimately decided on the outfit I’m
currently wearing.]
(b) I believed then and believe now that my actions are causally determined
by antecedent conditions beyond my control.
I maintain that (a) and (b) together with the argument from modus ponens
above provide a Moorean-style proof of deliberation-compatibilism.
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Of course, like G.E. Moore’s own ‘proof ’ of the external world, where
some zig others zag. As philosophers like to say, one person’s modus ponens
is another’s modus tollens—and that’s literally the case here. While I contend
that premise (2) is obvious from the fact that I did both this morning—i.e.,
I engaged in an active mental process aimed at figuring out what to wear
while also believing in causal determinism—deliberation-incompatibilists
will deny premise (2) and replace my modus ponens with a modus tollens.
Of course, they will provide arguments for why we should reject (2), but the
question at hand is whether the arguments they provide are strong enough
to overcome my two Moorean facts. For instance, they could argue that I’m
simply mistaken about my belief in causal determinism. That is, while I may
believe that I believe that my actions are causally determined by antecedent
conditions beyond my control, I don’t really believe what I believe that I believe.
Such a move, however, is bound to fail for (at least) two main reasons. First, to
simply assume I must be mistaken about (b) because it’s obviously impossible
to believe in determinism and rationally deliberation at the same time, would
be to beg the question against the deliberation-compatibilist and assume the
very thing that is under dispute. Secondly, while it may be possible for one to
believe that P without also believing that one believes that P, it is not at all clear that
the opposite is the case. That is, to believe that one believes that P would appear
sufficient for one to believe that P. For these and other reasons, I’ll assume this
strategy is not the one deliberation-incompatibilists should take.
The more promising approach, and the one taken by most deliberation-
incompatibilists, is to argue that while I may have deliberated about what to
wear this morning, I did not rationally deliberate. That’s because rational delib-
eration requires that I have no inconsistent beliefs salient to my deliberation, yet
belief in determinism is inconsistent with a necessary condition for rational de-
liberation: the belief in the openness of options. In the following section, I’ll exam-
ine this argument for deliberation-incompatibilism and explain why it too fails.
I’ll argue that deliberation only requires epistemic openness, not metaphysical
openness, and epistemic openness does not conflict with an agent’s believing
that their actions are causally determined by antecedent conditions beyond
their control. I’ll further argue that deliberation-compatibilists should embrace
an epistemic condition on the efficacy of deliberation in additional to an epis-
temic openness condition. I’ll spell out my preferred formulations of each of
these conditions and argue that they provide a coherent account of how one can
rationally deliberate and believe in causal determinism without inconsistency.
II. RATIONAL DELIBERATION AND DETERMINISM
One of the main concerns’ deliberation-incompatibilists have with determin-
ism is that is appears to rule out the kind of openness of options required for
rational deliberation. When we deliberate, we typically believe that we have
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ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF RATIONAL DELIBERATION AND DETERMINISM 5
more than one distinct option available to us for which action to perform, each
of which is available to us in the sense that we ‘can’ or ‘could’ perform each
of these actions. It is often argued that belief in such openness is required for
deliberation, or at least for rational deliberation. For example, Peter van Inwa-
gen writes, ‘if someone deliberates about whether to do A or to do B, it follows
that his behavior manifests a belief that it is possible for him to do A—that he
can do A, that he has it within his power to do A—and a belief that it is possible
for him to do B’ (Ginet 1966; cf. Kant 1785/1981: AK IV 448; Stapleton 2010;
Taylor 1966: ch.12; van Inwagen 1983: 155). Some philosophers maintain that
belief in this kind of openness conflicts with the truth of determinism in the
sense that, in any deliberative situation, the truth of determinism would rule
out the availability to us of all but one distinct option for what to do, and
thus would rule out the openness about what to do. Accordingly, this line
of reasoning supports a kind of deliberation-incompatibilism (see, e.g., Ginet
1966; Taylor 1966), which maintains that S’s deliberating and being rational
is incompatible with S’s believing that their actions are causally determined.
But does determinism conflict with the kind of openness required for rational
deliberation? Most deliberation-compatibilists acknowledge that deliberation
requires a kind of openness, but rather than interpret it metaphysically they
provide an epistemic interpretation of ‘can’ or ‘could’. As Pereboom explains:
It does seem plausible that when we deliberate about what to do, we typically presuppose
that we have more than one distinct option for which action to perform, each of which
is available to us in the sense that we can or could perform each of these actions. But the
sense of ‘can’ or ‘could’ featured in such beliefs might not always or even typically be
metaphysical. It might well be that in some such cases, it is epistemic, and in many others
it is indeterminate between a metaphysical and epistemic sense. On certain epistemic
interpretations, such beliefs would not conflict with a belief in determinism. When I
am deliberating whether to do A, supposing I correctly believe determinism is true, I
would not know whether I will in fact do A since I lack the knowledge of the antecedent
conditions and laws that would be required to make the prediction based on these
factors, not to mention the time and wherewithal. So even if I believe that it is causally
determined that I will not do A, I might without inconsistency believe that it is in a sense
epistemically possible that I do A, and that I could do A in this epistemic sense. (2014: 107)
Epistemic accounts of this kind have been developed by a number of
deliberation-compatibilists, including Dennett (1984), Kapitan (1986), Pettit
(1989), Nelkin (2004, 2011), and Pereboom (2014). The account I prefer main-
tains that the beliefs about the possibility of acting salient for deliberation are in
some key respects epistemic but that there are two key compatibilist epistemic
states. One of these specifies an epistemic notion of openness for what to do,
and the other is an epistemic condition on the efficacy of deliberation (see,
e.g., Kapitan 1986; Pereboom 2014). In what follows, I’ll focus on Pereboom’s
formulations of these conditions since they plausibly deliver a coherent way of
making sense of the relevant epistemic notions of openness and deliberative ef-
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ficacy, while at the same time avoiding some of the more well-known counterex-
amples that have plagued other extant accounts (see, e.g., Pereboom 2014: ch.5).
The epistemic openness condition I endorse can be articulated as follows:
(EO) In order to deliberate rationally among distinct actions A1. . . An, for each Ai,
S cannot be certain of the proposition that she will do Ai, nor of the proposition that
she will not do Ai; and either (a) the proposition that she will do Ai is consistent with
every proposition that, in the present context, is settled for her, or (b) if it inconsistent
with some such proposition, she cannot believe that it is. (Pereboom 2014: 113)2
This condition maintains that in order for an agent to deliberate rationally
among distinct action A1. . . An, for each Ai, the agent cannot be certain of the
proposition that they will do some action Ai, nor of the proposition that they will
not do Ai. Furthermore, the proposition that they will do Ai must be consistent
with every proposition that, in the present context, is settled for them—where,
‘A proposition is settled for an agent just in case she believes it and disregards
any uncertainty she has that it is true, e.g., for the purpose of deliberation’
(2014: 133). Clause (b) is required because although there may be certain cases in
which I can rationally deliberate about whether to do Ai even if in fact my doing
Ai is inconsistent with a proposition I regard as settled in that context, ‘it is cru-
cial that I then not believe that it is inconsistent’—since, ‘if I did believe this, it’s
intuitive that I couldn’t rationally deliberate about whether to do A’ (2014: 114).
It is exactly this epistemic sense of ‘can’ or ‘could’ that was implicit in my
Moorean-style proof, since when I deliberated this morning about what to
wear, although I may have been causally determined to decide as I did, I was
neither certain that I would pick shirt∗ (∗the shirt I’m currently wearing), nor
certain that I would not. Furthermore, the proposition that I would choose
shirt∗ was consistent with every other proposition that was settled for me in the
context of my deliberation. (EO) therefore provides a plausible understanding
of the kind of epistemic openness required for rational deliberation, and in
no way conflicts with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined by
antecedent conditions beyond their control.
On its own, however, the epistemic openness condition does not provide a
successful compatibilist account of rational deliberation. Belief in the efficacy
of deliberation is required in addition. To see why, consider the following
example provided by van Inwagen:
[I]magine that [an agent] is in a room with two doors and that he believes one of the
doors to be unlocked and other door to be locked and impassable, though he has no
idea which is which: let him then attempt to imagine himself deliberating about which
door to leave by. (1983: 154)
2 In Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014), Pereboom labels this principle (S). I am here
relabeling it (EO)—for the Epistemic Openness condition—for sake of consistency.
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ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF RATIONAL DELIBERATION AND DETERMINISM 7
About this example, Dana Nelkin remarks: ‘While it seems that I can deliberate
about which door to decide to try to open and even which door handle to decide
to jiggle, if I know one of them to be locked and impassable, it also seems that
I cannot deliberate about which door to open—or even which door to decide to
open’ (2011b: 130). Van Inwagen’s example poses a problem for deliberation-
compatibilists since it satisfies (EO) but is also plausibly a case where rational
deliberation about which door to open is ruled out. What’s more:
. . . if an agent believed determinism and its consequences, then in any deliberative
situation she would believe that all but one option for what to do was closed off; ‘locked
and impassible,’ so to speak (although she would ordinarily not have a belief about
which one was not closed off). If in the example one cannot deliberate about which
door to open, and one believed determinism and its consequences, then it seems that
one would never be able to deliberate about what to do. A compatibilist account would
need to explain why rational deliberation is not possible in the two-door case, but
nonetheless possible for the determinist. (Pereboom 2014: 116)
To solve this problem, several deliberation-compatibilists have suggested that
rational deliberation also requires a belief in the efficacy of deliberation (see
Kapitan 1986: 247; Nelkin 2004b; Pereboom 2014). That is, rational deliber-
ators must believe that for each of the options for action under consideration,
deliberation about it would, under normal conditions, be efficacious in
producing the choice for that action and the action itself (Pereboom 2014: 117).
In van Inwagen’s example, then, we can say that it’s not the absence of a belief
in openness that precludes deliberation about which door to open. Rather,
what precludes such deliberation is that given the agent’s belief that one of the
two doors is locked, if he is rational he will believe that his deliberation would
not ultimately be efficacious for him opening one of the doors (Pereboom
2014: 117). This is not the case, however, in the normal case of determinism.
That is, unlike the two-door case, when a determinist is deliberating under
ordinary doxastic circumstances, he can, upon proper reflection, form the
true belief that his deliberation makes a difference with respect to which
action he performs. So there is an explanation for why the agent cannot
rationally deliberate in the two-door case that does not apply to ordinary
doxastic scenarios in which a determinist deliberates (Cohen 2018: 91).
We therefore need to add to (EO) a second deliberative-efficacy condition.
Nelkin (2011: 142) and Kapitan (1996: 436) each offer formulations of their
own, but I will once again focus on Pereboom’s formulation:
(DE) In order to rationally deliberate about whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 and A2
are distinct actions, an agent must believe that if as a result of her deliberating about
whether to do A1 or A2 she were to judge that it would be best to do A1, then, under
normal conditions, she would also, on the basis of this deliberation, do A1; and similarly
for A2. (2014: 118-9)
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The important thing to note is that while (DE) is not met by the agent in
the two-door situation, it is satisfied by someone in an ordinary deliberative
situation in which they believe that determinism is true and that they therefore
have only one possibility for decision and action—but they do not know
which. Hence, (DE) avoids van Inwagen’s counterexample while making sense
of the belief in deliberative efficacy under ordinary doxastic circumstances in
which a determinist deliberates. If an agent believes that because determinism
is true they cannot either do A1 or A2 on the basis of deliberation, but they
do not know which, they can still meet condition (DE): for they might still
rationally believe that if they were to judge doing A1 best, they would do A
on the basis of deliberation, and similarly for A2.
Returning to my Moorean-style proof of deliberation-compatibilism, we can
now say that (EO) and (DE), together with other uncontroversial conditions
necessary for rational deliberation, provide a plausible and coherent account
of how I can deliberate about what to wear and believe, without inconsistency,
that my actions are causally determined by antecedent conditions beyond my
control. Rational deliberation only requires epistemic openness and an epis-
temic condition on the efficacy of deliberation, neither of which conflict with
believing in causal determinism. So, when I engaged in an active mental pro-
cess aimed at figuring out what to wear this morning, my deliberation in no way
conflicted with my belief in causal determinism, since I satisfied the epistemic
openness condition (EO) and the deliberative-efficacy condition (DE).
But perhaps the deliberation-compatibilist is not out of the woods yet.
III. COHEN’S COUNTEREXAMPLE
Let me now turn to a recent objection by Yishai Cohen (2018) against the kind
of account just sketched. Cohen offers, what he considers to be, a counterexam-
ple to ‘all recent pro-DC [deliberative-compatibilist] views’ (2018: 92). The pu-
tative counterexample involves an agent who satisfies all of the requirements for
rational deliberation according to deliberation-compatibilists, including (EO)
and (DE), and yet the agent apparently cannot rationally deliberate about what
to do in light of her belief concerning her impending deterministic manipula-
tion. A simplified version of Cohen’s counterexample can be summarized as fol-
lows (Cohen 2018: 92–3): [Note: While Cohen’s original presentation includes
several premises addressing other leading formulations of the deliberative-
efficacy condition by Kapitan (1996: 436), Clarke (1992: 103), Dennett (1984:
115), and Nelkin (2011: 142), I focus here only its treatment of Pereboom’s for-
mulation. I will grant that if the counterexample succeeds against (EO) and
(DE), it succeeds tout court as an argument against ‘all recent pro-DC views’.]
Case 1 (I)-(IV) are true:
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(I) Betty believes the following. Betty is offered a choice to press one of the two
buttons in front of her. If she presses the left button (henceforth ‘LEFT’),
Betty will receive $1000. If she presses the right button (henceforth
‘RIGHT’), then Oxfam will instead receive $1000. Betty cannot alter who
received the money once the first button is pressed. Moreover, if Betty
presses both buttons simultaneously or presses no buttons at all, then no
one received the money.
Betty is a U.S. citizen who is financially better off than most people in the
world but is nevertheless burdened with financial debt. She has a strong
desire to press LEFT in order to pay off some of her debt. However, Betty
believes that donating the money to Oxfam will benefit people who are
far worse off then her (Betty knows that she frequently but not exclusively
undergoes rationally egoistic tendencies).
(II) Betty believes neither that she will press LEFT, nor that she will
press RIGHT. Moreover, all of Betty’s beliefs are consistent with the
proposition that she will press LEFT, and the proposition that she will
press RIGHT. So Betty satisfies the condition in EO.
(III) Betty believes that if as a result of her deliberation about whether to
press LEFT or RIGHT she were to judge that it would be best to press
LEFT, then, under moral conditions, she would also, on the basis of
this deliberation press LEFT; and similarly for pressing RIGHT. So Betty
satisfied the condition in DE.
(IV) Betty believes the following. A team of neuroscientists has the ability to
manipulate her neural states at any time by radio-like technology. Prior
to Betty’s deliberation, the neuroscientists have decided arbitrarily (on
the basis of a coin toss) to causally affect Betty’s imminent decision (cf.
Pereboom 2014: 76–7). As a result, the neuroscientists will manipulate
Betty to press (and decide to press) one of the buttons by exerting either
an egoism-enhancing or egoism-diminishing monetary influence upon
Betty. If they exert a monetary egoism-enhancing influence, then Betty
will press LEFT. If they exert a monetary egoism-diminishing influence,
then Betty will press RIGHT.
While Betty does not know which kind of influence she will undergo,
she believes that the neuroscientists only have the capability of either
enhancing or diminishing Betty’s egoistic tendencies. In other words, if the
neuroscientists are capable of diminishing Betty’s egoistic tendencies, then
they do not have the capability to enhance such tendencies (and vice versa).
Finally, the neuroscientists will manipulate Betty’s decision (which results
from her deliberation) to press one of the buttons. The neuroscientists do
not in any way alter Betty’s ultimate judgement concerning what she has most
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reason to do, all things considered. So Betty’s decision will be manipulated
by slightly altering Betty’s egoistic tendencies while Betty deliberates in
order for her deliberation to generate a different ‘output’ than it might
otherwise generate in the absence of such a manipulation.
Cohen further stipulates:
Notice that (according to Betty’s beliefs) the neuroscientists will in fact intervene, even
if Betty would perform the same action in the absence of such manipulation. If I
were to stipulate instead that the neuroscientists intervene only if, in the absence of
manipulation, Betty would not have pressed the neuroscientists’ pre-selected button,
then Case 1 would strike a resemblance with Frankfurt-style cases, which in turn would
raise numerous vexing issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. For this reason, I
maintain that the intervention by the neuroscientists does not depend upon what Betty
would do in the absence of manipulation. Moreover, we may also stipulate that Betty
has no belief about what she would in fact do in the absence of this manipulation since,
according to (I), she believes that she frequently but not exclusively undergoes rationally
egoistic tendencies. (2018: 93-4)
With this understanding of Case 1, let us inspect whether it is a genuine
counterexample to the account of deliberation-compatibilism sketched in the
previous section.
Cohen provides the following argument for why the counterexample
succeeds:3
(1∗) In Case 1, Betty satisfies the conditions in EO and DE with respect to
rationally deliberating about which button to press.
(2∗) In Case 1, Betty satisfies the no inconsistent beliefs condition (which Cohen
calls the (NIB) thesis) with respect to rationally deliberating about which
button to press. [NIB maintains that in order to rationally deliberate
about whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 and A2 are distinct actions,
an agent must not have any inconsistent beliefs that are salient for her
deliberating about whether to do A1 or A2 (Cohen 2018: 86).]
(3∗) In Case 1, Betty cannot rationally deliberate about which button to press.
(4∗) If (1)-(3) are true, then Case 1 is a counterexample to deliberation-
compatibilism and the account defended in the previous section.
(5∗) Therefore, Case 1 is a counterexample to deliberation-compatibilism and
the account defended in the previous section.
Since premises (1∗) and (4∗) are uncontroversial, especially since (1∗) was
stipulated as true as part of Cohen’s Case 1, I’ll simply grant these. The
3 Again, I’m simplifying here by leaving out the various conditions offered by other leading
deliberation-compatibilist accounts, which Cohen stipulates his counterexample also satisfies.
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premises in need of defence are premises (2∗) and (3∗). And while I think there
are important issues worth exploring with regard to premise (2∗), since this is
one potential place to attach the argument, I’ll grant this premise as well so
as to focus my attention on premise (3∗).
Cohen argues for premise (3∗) on the basis of the following principle:
Causal Influence: Necessarily, if an agent S believes the following,
• Either agent T will ϕ or T will ψ (but T will not perform both actions),
• S cannot causally contribute to either T’s ϕ-ing or T’s ψ-ing.
• T’s ϕ-ing is (in conjunction with the laws of nature) causally sufficient for
the occurrence of event e.
• T’s ψ-ing is (in conjunction with the laws of nature) causally sufficient for
the occurrence of event e.
then S cannot rationally deliberate about whether to permit the occurrence
of e.
In order to motivate this principle, Cohen provides the following example:
Alex is viewing a live television broadcast of an eight-ball billiards match. The opening
move is made, but no balls are pocketed. The next player will strike the cue ball
towards the left or toward the right. In conjunction with the laws of nature, striking
the cue ball towards the left is causally sufficient for the pocketing of the #14 striped
ball, and striking the cue ball towards the right is causally sufficient for the pocketing
of the #7 solid ball. Viewing this match from home, Alex cannot causally contribute
to the player’s next move. Moreover, Alex believes all of this. So Alex cannot rationally
deliberate about whether to permit the pocketing of the #14 striped ball or the #7 solid
ball. Generalizing from this case, it follows that Causal Influence is true. (2018: 94-5)
Given the truth of Causal Influence, Cohen argues that we can establish premise
(3∗) once we recall what Betty believes according to (IV). That is, either the
neuroscientists will decide that Betty presses LEFT or the neuroscientists
will decide that Betty presses RIGHT. She cannot causally contribute to the
neuroscientists’ nefarious activity (recall that their decision is based on a coin
toss). The neuroscientists’ decision that Betty pressed LEFT is (in conjunction
with the laws of nature) causally sufficient for the occurrence of Betty’s pressing
LEFT (and similarly for RIGHT). Cohen therefore concludes: ‘It thus follows
from Causal Influence that Betty cannot rationally deliberate about whether to
permit the occurrence of Betty’s pressing LEFT or Betty’s pressing RIGHT.
So Betty cannot rationally deliberate about which button to press’ (2018: 95).
After providing this defence of premise (3∗), Cohen proceeds to offer an
FCDA against deliberation-compatibilism similar to Pereboom’s FCMA
against the kind of compatibilism relevant to the free will debate—i.e., the
compatibility of determinism and the kind of free will required for basic
desert moral responsibility (see Pereboom 2001, 2014). According to Case 2,
premises (I)–(III) are all the same and again true, but instead of (IV), (V) is true:
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(V) Betty believes the following. Long ago, a team of neuroscientists decided
arbitrarily (on the basis of a coin toss) which button Betty is to press (and
decide to press). As a result, these neuroscientists have programmed
Betty at the beginning of her life in such a manner that she will press
(and decide to press) one of the buttons, though Betty has no belief about
which button the neuroscientists want her to press. (Cohen 2018: 98–9)
According to Case 3, (I)–(III) are the same, but instead of (IV), (VI) is true:
(VI) Betty believes the following. The training practices of Betty’s community
(which were completed before she developed the ability to prevent or
alter these practices) causally determined the nature of her deliberative
reasoning processes such that, in conjunction with certain background
conditions, Betty is causally determined to press (and decide to press)
one of the buttons. Though, Betty has no belief about which button she
will in fact press. (2018: 99)
Lastly, according to Case 4, (I)–(III) are the same, but instead of (IV), (VII)
is true:
(VII) Betty believes the following. Everything that happens in the universe is
causally determined by its past states together with the laws of nature.
Betty is an ordinary human being raised in normal circumstances. As
a result, Betty’s deliberative reasoning processes, in conjunction with
certain background conditions, will causally determine Betty to press
(and decide to press) one of the buttons. Though, Betty has no believe
about which button she will in fact press (Cohen 2018: 99).
Cohen maintains that whether Betty believes that the process of manipulation
begins a few seconds prior to her decision (in Case 1) or at the beginning of
her life (in Case 2) does not make a difference with respect to Betty’s ability
to rationally deliberate about which button to press. The same is true with
respect of Betty’s beliefs in Case 2 and 3; and similarly for Cases 3 and 4. This
leads Cohen to conclude:
So in light of the fact that Betty cannot rationally deliberate in Case 1, Betty cannot
rationally deliberate in any of these four cases. The best explanation for Betty’s inability
to rationally deliberate in all four cases is that Betty believes that whichever action she
performs (and decides to perform) will be causally determined by factors beyond her
control. (2018: 99)
Hence, according to Cohen, rational deliberation requires an agent to lack
the belief that her action will be causally determined by factors beyond her
control. And as a result, rational deliberation is incompatible with belief in
causal determinism.
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But Cohen also suggests that there is a ‘more fundamental explanation as to
why [deliberation-compatibilism] is false’, namely: ‘Perhaps one must believe
that one will be the source of one’s action, such that being the source of one’s
action is incompatible with determinism (Kant 1785/1981, 448; Taylor 1964,
76; Castañeda 1975, 134–135)’ (Cogen 2018: 99). But instead of proposing that
an agent must believe some proportion p, Cohen claims that the deliberation-
incompatibilist can resort to the weaker claim that an agent must lack the belief
that not-p. He thus offers the following requirement on rational deliberation:
Source: In order to rationally deliberate about whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 and
A2 are distinct actions, an agent S must not believe that it is not the case that S will be
the source of whichever action S performs, such that being the source of one’s action
is incompatible with the action being causally determined by factors beyond one’s
control. (2018: 99)
He further suggests that the notion of ‘sourcehood’ relevant to rational
deliberation is the same notion relevant to moral responsibility, such that
Pereboom’s FCMA against basic desert moral responsibility is sound if and
only if Cohen’s FCDA against deliberation-compatibilism is sound (2018: 101).
IV. WHY COHEN’S MANIPULATION ARGUMENT IS NOT A
COUNTEREXAMPLE
Cohen’s FCDA is an interesting one. It also poses a unique challenge for some-
one like me, who accepts deliberation-compatibilism but who also believes that
manipulation arguments, like Pereboom’s FCMA, succeed in refuting compat-
ibilism in the free will debate (see Caruso 2014, 2021; Dennett and Caruso 2021;
Pereboom and Caruso 2018). In this section, I’ll argue that Cohen is mistaken
that FCDA and FCMA ‘stand or fall together’ (2018: 101), and that a proper
understanding of the notions of ‘sourcehood’ and ‘control’ relevant to rational
deliberation will allow us to distinguish them from the kind of control in ac-
tion, i.e., free will, required for basic desert moral responsibility. Furthermore,
I’ll offer a ‘hard-line’ reply to Cohen’s FCDA, challenging (3∗) and arguing
that Betty can, in fact, rationally deliberate about which button to press. My
response will be based on an important disanalogy between Betty and Alex.
To begin, there are essentially two ways to respond to Cohen’s FCDA argu-
ment, which divide into so-called hard-line and soft-line replies. The hard-line
reply claims that in Case 1, Betty can in fact rationally deliberate about which
button to press, hence premise (3∗) of Cohen’s argument is false (Haas 2013;
cf. McKenna 2008, 2014). The hard-line reply rejects the central intuition
that the kinds of manipulation involved in Cases 1, 2, and 3 undermine rational
deliberation. It recommends that instead of beginning with Case 1 and working
toward the case of natural determinism, we work our intuitions in the opposite
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direction. That is, the hard-line reply begins with Case 4, the case of natural
determinism, and concludes that in such circumstances Betty can rationally
deliberate about which button to press. It then argues that, since there are no
relevant differences between Cases 4 and 3, 3 and 2, and 2 and 1, capable of
justifying a different outcome, we should conclude that Betty can rationally
deliberate about which button to press in Case 1, despite the truth of (IV).
The soft-line reply, on the other hand, seeks to identify a relevant difference
between two adjacent cases, such that Betty can rationally deliberate in
one of these cases but not the other. For example, one could argue that the
reason Betty cannot rationally deliberate in Cases 1–3 but can in Case 4 is
that, it is only in the latter case that Betty does not believe that the causal
determination of her choice includes in some manner the intentional actions
of others (cf. Lycan 1997: 115–9). Or, perhaps, one could argue that since
Betty believes that she is being manipulated in a particularly invasive manner
only in Case 1 (cf. Demetriou 2010; Fischer and Tognazzini 2011: 18–25) or
only in Cases 1–2 (cf. Mele 2006: 141–4), Betty cannot rationally deliberate in
these cases. Soft-line replies therefore grant that Cohen is correct that in Case
1 Betty cannot deliberate about which button to press, but they deny that this
conclusion carries over to the case of natural determinism (Case 4). According
to soft-liners, while Cohen’s Case 1 may establish that rational deliberation is
not compatible with the belief that our neural states have been manipulated
by a team of neurosciences, it does not establish that rational deliberation is
incompatible with a general belief in natural determinism.
I’ll explain below why I think the hard-line reply is not only the correct
response, but why it succeeds against Cohen’s FCDA but not as a reply to
Pereboom’s FCDA.
Against the hard-line response, Cohen writes: ‘The main concern with this
response is that one must deny the Causal Influence principle since this principle
entails premise [3∗]’ (2018: 100). Cohen’s Causal Influence principle, recall, was
motivated by the eight-ball billiards match example. According to Cohen, the
principle renders the correct verdict that Alex cannot rationally deliberate
about whether to permit the pocketing of the #14 striped ball or the #7 solid
ball. The problem, however, is that there is an important disanology between
Alex (in the eight-ball billiards example) and Betty (in the FCDA). Namely,
Betty is in a position to contribute causally to what happens next, while Alex is not. Betty,
recall, not only satisfies the conditions of epistemic openness and deliberative-
efficacy, she also satisfies other uncontroversial conditions on agency. For
instance, Betty’s decision to press one of the buttons, regardless of whether it is
manipulated by a team of neuroscientists or causally determined by natural
factors outside her control, causally contributes to her pressing the button.
For instance, if her egoistic tendencies are momentarily enhanced, due either
to natural deterministic factors or manipulation, she will decide and then
press LEFT. If, on the other hand, her egoistic tendencies are momentarily
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diminished, she will decide and then press RIGHT. Either way, her agential
structures will play an important causal role in which button she presses. This
is not the case with Alex. In fact, Alex exercises no causal influence over which
billiard ball is pocketed nor does he believe that he does. In Alex’s case, the
relevant causation does not pass through his agential structure.
Cohen appears to be aware of this type of reply, since he writes: ‘A
hard-liner who seeks such an alternative explanation could modify the last
part of Casual Influence in the following manner: “. . . then S cannot rationally
deliberate about whether to permit the occurrence of e, unless e concerns a
decision by S”’ (2018: 100). Cohen acknowledges that: ‘This modified principle
can account for Alex’s inability to rationally deliberate, and can accommodate
the position that Betty can rationally deliberate in Case 1’ (2018: 100). Since
Cohen acknowledges that this modification would sink his entire argument
by providing a straightforward explanation of why Alex is unable to rationally
deliberate, but Betty is, he must reject it. So how does he go about arguing
against it? All we get is the following, rather unsatisfying two sentences:
‘While I find this modification to Causal Influence to be ad hoc, I don’t expect
deliberation compatibilists to share this intuition. Breaking this stalemate in
the future will require further dialectical maneuvers’ (2018: 100).
Cohen is correct that I fail to find such a modification ad hoc. I don’t find
it ad hoc at all to think that Betty’s decision to press LEFT or RIGHT, even
if determined, is relevant to Causal Influence. Since Betty is in a position to
contribute causally to what happens next, while Alex is not, Betty (though not
Alex) is able to exercise causal influence over what happens next. I therefore
maintain that the reason Alex is unable to deliberate about which ball to
pocket next is that he cannot contribute causally to the next move in the sense
that the causal chain sufficient for either the pocketing of the #7 ball or the
#14 ball never ‘passes through’ him in a way that would allow him to causally
contribute to the outcome and hence exercise causal influence. Betty, on the
other hand, does exercise causal influence over what button she presses in the
sense that her pressing LEFT or RIGHT involves a decision and concerns a
causal chain that passes through her agential structures. I therefore agree with
Cohen that an agent cannot rationally deliberate about events and actions
that they have no causal influence over, but I strongly disagree that Betty lacks
causal influence in anything like the same way that Alex does.
I propose, then, that for an agent to exercise the kind of causal influence
relevant to rational deliberation, the causal chain must pass through their
agential structures. We can call this the deliberative causal influence (DCI) principle
and define it more accurately as follows:
(DCI): For an agent S to exercise the kind of causal influence relevant to rational
deliberation, the causal chain must pass through S’s agential structures and the resulting
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action, whatever it ends up being, be the result of S’s decision—where ‘be the result of ’
is understood causally.
(DCI) allows us to identify an intuitively relevant difference between Betty
and Alex—namely Betty satisfies DCI, while Alex does not. This difference,
I contend, explains why Alex is unable to rationally deliberate in the billiards
example—e.g., he believes he lacks deliberative causal influence over the next
move. Betty, on the other hand, does not believe she lacks the relevant kind
of deliberative causal influence, since (IV) does not undermine such causal
influence, hence she can rationally deliberate. If this is correct, then Cohen
has failed to provide a convincing argument for (3∗), the crucial premise.
My hard-line reply therefore maintains that Betty can rationally deliberate
about which button to press in all four cases of Cohen’s FCDA, as long as
she satisfies (EO) and (DE), and also not believe that she lacks the kind of
deliberative causal influence specified by (DCI).
Cohen may reply that while Betty satisfies (DCI) and Alex does not, what
makes the two cases analogous is that Betty cannot causally contribute to the
neuroscientists’ nefarious activities, which are causally sufficient for the occur-
rence of Betty pressing LEFT or RIGHT, and she believes this. That is, Cohen
could argue that the kind of causal influence relevant to rational deliberation
requires that Betty be able to causally influence those distal causes (or some
relevant subset of them) that are sufficient for her pressing LEFT or RIGHT.
But that is exactly the claim I have just challenged. The mistake, I contend,
is that such a demand conflates the kind of control necessary for free will and
basic desert moral responsibility, with the kind of control required for rational
deliberation. Rational deliberation, I contend, requires only the minimal
kind of control specified in (DCI), and perhaps some other non-controversial
conditions. The control in action required for free will, on the other hand,
arguably requires Cohen’s more robust notion of control. Once we separate
these two notions, however, and see that rational deliberation only requires
belief in the weaker notion of control, the problem goes away.
Let me conclude with some final thoughts on the deeper issues of
sourcehood relevant to the free will debate. While I contend that Betty is
able to rationally deliberate about which button to press in Cases (1)–(4),
without inconsistency, I also maintain that Pereboom’s FCMA succeeds as an
argument against compatibilism. I therefore disagree with Cohen that FCDA
and FCMA ‘stand or fall together’ (2018: 101). Our disagreement, I think,
comes down to the following question: Are the notions of control and
sourcehood relevant to rational deliberation the same notions relevant to free
will and moral responsibility? Cohen contends they are (2018: 101–3), while
I contend they are not.
Consider, again, Cohen’s Source principle, which maintains that: ‘In order
to rationally deliberate about whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 and A2
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are distinct actions, an agent S must not believe that it is not the case
that S will be the source of whichever action S performs’. He then defines
sourcehood in incompatibilist terms, writing: ‘being the source of one’s
actions is incompatible with the action being causally determined by factors
beyond one’s control’ (2018: 99). But why define sourcehood in this way? By
doing so, Cohen is lead to conclude that rational deliberation is incompatible
with belief in causal determinism—since an agent must believe they are the
source of whichever action they perform (or, at least, not believe they are not
the source) in order to rationally deliberate, and such a belief (according to
Cohen) is incompatible with causal determinism. He then adds, ‘the same
notion of sourcehood is relevant to both moral responsibility and rational
deliberation’ (2018: 101). That is: ‘An agent must be the source of her action in
order to be morally responsible for that action. Moreover, according to Source,
in order to rationally deliberate, an agent must refrain from believing that she
is not the source of whichever action she will in fact perform’ (2018: 101).
I disagree with Cohen that the same notions of sourcehood are relevant to
rational deliberation and moral responsibility. While I cannot provide a full ac-
counting of the difference between these notions here, I will offer the following
brief proposal which I believe provides a prima facie case for distinguishing
the two notions. I propose that the kind of sourcehood relevant to rational
deliberation is the kind captured by the principle of deliberative causal influence
(DCI), which requires that an agent S causally contribute to whatever action
S performs, such that the causal chain pass through S’s agential structures and
the resulting action, whatever it ends up being, be the result of S’s decision. This
provides an intuitively plausible account of the kind of sourcehood relevant
to rational deliberation without assuming anything about the kind of control
in action, i.e., free will, required for basic desert moral responsibility. Without
begging the question, I see no reason why we should demand more than this
weak notion of sourcehood when it comes to rational deliberation. Furthermore,
this notion of sourcehood in no way conflicts with causal determinism, so there
is no inconsistency in Betty not believing that she lacks such sourcehood (to
stick with Cohen’s way of formulating things) and Betty believing that her
actions are causally determined by conditions beyond her control.
On the other hand, I propose that the kind of sourcehood and control re-
quired for free will is the kind needed for basic desert morally responsible (Caruso
2021; Dennett and Caruso 2021; Pereboom 2001, 2014). As Pereboom explains:
For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense is for it to be hers in
such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was morally
wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally
exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to
be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given an understanding
of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialists or
contractualist considerations. (2014: 2)
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Understood this way, free will is a kind of power or ability an agent
must possess in order to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgements,
attitudes, or treatments—such as resentment, indignation, moral anger, and
retributive punishment—in response to decisions or actions that the agent
performed or failed to perform. These reactions would be justified on purely
backward-looking grounds, that’s what makes them basic, and would not
appeal to consequentialist or forward-looking considerations, such as future
protection, future reconciliation, or future moral formation (see Caruso and
Morris 2017; Dennett and Caruso 2021; Pereboom 2001, 2014).
But once we define free will as the control in action required for basic
desert moral responsible, it becomes at least prima facie plausible to think that
free will requires something more than just the deliberative causal influence of
agents. What this ‘something more’ is, is, of course, a matter of great dispute.
But consider the following argument for free will incompatibilism from Peter
van Inwagen:
If determinism is true, then there is some state of the world in the distant past P that
is connected by the laws of nature to any action A that one performs in the present.
But since no one is responsible for the state of the world P in the distant past, and no
one is responsible for the laws of nature that lead from P to A, it follows that no one is
responsible for any action A that is performed in the present. (1983: 182-3)
This argument nicely captures one of the main incompatibilist intuitions about
determinism and free will (see also Pereboom 2001: 34). The problem is that if
determinism is true, then there are conditions for which no one is, or ever has
been, even partly responsible (in the basic desert sense relevant to free will),
and these conditions determine the actual sequence that brings about the agent’s
action. For reasons such as these, I have elsewhere argued for the following in-
compatibilist intuition about determinism and free will: ‘An action is free in the
sense required for [basic desert] moral responsibility only if it is not produced
by a deterministic process that traces back to causal factors beyond the agent’s
control’ (Pereboom 2001: 34; see, e.g., Caruso 2021; Dennett and Caruso 2021).
We can see, then, that there are other notions of sourcehood, stronger notions,
which can be taken as the relevant notion in the traditional free will debate. For
instance, source incompatibilists about free will would argue that the relevant
notion of sourcehood requires that an agent S not only causally contribute to
whichever action S performs, understood as defined by DCI, but that S also
be the source of their action in a sense incompatible with S’s being causally
determined by antecedent conditions beyond their control. Agent-causal lib-
ertarians may go further and add that S must also poses the control in action
required to settle which action they perform, where such settling is not only
incompatible with causal determinism but also incompatible with simple event
indeterminism. Note, though, that under the assumption of determinism,
weak sourcehood is still possible, since it in no way conflicts with determinism,
while the stronger notion of sourcehood, what we might call ultimate sourcehood,
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would be ruled out. So even if we grant Cohen the assumption that causal
determinism is incompatible with ultimate sourcehood, a view I actually
share, it does not follow that Betty must give up the belief that she is the source
of her actions in the weak sense—the sense relevant to rational deliberation.
This all brings me to my final point. While I have offered a hard-line reply
to Cohen’s FCDA, it does not follow that a similar hard-line reply will work
against Pereboom’s FCMA. If I’m correct that the notions of sourcehood and
control relevant to rational deliberation are distinct from the notions relevant
to free will and basic desert moral responsibility, then it’s possible for an incom-
patibilist in the free will debate to argue that causal determinism undermines
the control in action required for basic desert moral responsibility, while at the
same time claiming that the control required for rational deliberation remains
compatible with causal determinism. This, in fact, is my own view. And
although I have not argued for Pereboom’s FCMA here, nor have I argued
against the hard-line replies to it, I have done so elsewhere (Caruso 2021).
There is no inconsistent belief, however, in defending this combination of views
since actual manipulation by a team of neuroscientists may in fact pose a threat
to the control in action required for basic desert moral responsibility, while
belief in such manipulation not threaten the weaker notion of control required
for rational deliberation. For this reason, FCMA and FCDA need not stand or
fall together.
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